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I. SUPPOSITION AND SIGNIFICATION
In an insightful article on the medieval theory of supposition, Elizabeth
Karger noted a remarkable development in the characterization of the
material mode of supposition between William of Ockham and his contem-
poraries in the early fourteenth century and Paul of Venice and others at
the turn of the fifteenth century.1 For William, material supposition is
explicitly ‘non-significative’, while for Paul, every mode of supposition is a
kind of signification.2 In particular, we can set these definitions in opposi-
tion:
William: “suppositio materialis est quando terminus non sup-
ponat significative.”3
Paul: “suppositio materialis est significatio termini.”4
William’s definition is typical of his time, in contrasting personal supposi-
tion as that of a term used significatively, with material supposition as one
where it supposits for things it is not used to signify. Other authors of the
early fourteenth century speak similarly. For example, John Buridan, in his
Sophismata, sets off the significative use of an expression, when it conse-
quently has personal supposition, against material supposition, where by
implication it is not used significatively.5
1. E. Karger, “La Supposition Materielle comme Supposition Significative:
Paul de Venise, Paul de Pergula,” in A. Maierù, ed., English Logic in Italy in the 14th
and 15th Centuries (Naples, 1982), pp. 331–41.
2. Paul of Venice, Logica Magna (Tractatus de Suppositionibus), ed. and trans. A.
Perreiah (St. Bonaventure, 1971), p. 4: “nam omnis suppositio est significatio.”
3. William of Ockham, Summa Logicae, ed. G. Gál et al. (St. Bonaventure,
1974), Part I, chap. 64, p. 196.
4. Paul of Venice, Logica Magna.
5. Johannes Buridanus, Sophismata, ed. T. K. Scott (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt,
1977), p. 53: “[tertium] sophisma [homo est species] est verum capiendo istum ter-
minum homo materialiter, et falsum capiendo personaliter sive significative.” Cf.
Buridanus, “Tractatus de Suppositionibus,” in M. E. Reina, ed., Rivista Critica di Storia
della Filosofia 12 (1957): 175–208, 323–52, 204, where Buridan says of the sophism,
“currit non potest esse subiectum propositionis”: “respondeo quod [currit] supponit
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Ockham, as is well-known, describes personal supposition as that where
a term supposits for what it signifies, since he believes each such term
signifies that of which it can be truly predicated.6 Others took terms to
signify universals, not their supposita, but their theories of supposition were
fundamentally the same, though, of course, differently expressed for that
reason. For example, Walter Burleigh says that a term in personal supposi-
tion does not supposit for what it signifies, but the intention is the same.7
Hence, Walter expresses the same non-significative view of material suppo-
sition as Ockham, but in different terminology:
Walter: “suppositio materialis est quando vox prolata
supponit pro seipsa prolata vel pro seipsa scripta vel etiam pro
alia voce quae non est inferior ad illam vocam eo modo
sumptam.”8
The inferiors of a term are those terms contained under it, that is, with
narrower extent.9 But this means that its inferiors manifest the universal
that the term signifies; the material supposita do not. And pseudo-Richard
Campsall agrees that material supposition is non-significative; he notes that
a term so used supposits for a word it does not signify.10
In the texts Karger discusses from a hundred years later, the situation
is very different. Paul of Venice describes material supposition as the sig-
nification of a term for itself or for its like; his pupil, Paul of Pergula,
actually describes it as the taking of a term for its material significate,
contrasting the material significate (itself or its like) with its personal sig-
nificate, the former requiring, the latter not requiring, a material sign
materialiter pro omni tali termino, sed propositio indigeat exponi, scilicet quod
nullus talis terminus currit potest esse subiectum propositionis significative sump-
tus; potest tamen sumptus materialiter.”
6. William of Ockham, Summa Logicae, Part I, chap. 33, p. 95: “Aliter accipitur
significare quando illud signum in aliqua propositione de praeterito vel de futuro
vel de presenti vel in aliqua propositione vera de modo potest pro illo supponere.”
Cf. P. V. Spade, “The Semantics of Terms,” in N. Kretzmann et al., ed, The Cambridge
History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 188–96, 191.
7. Walter Burleigh, De Puritate Artis Logicae Tractatus Longior, ed. P. Boehner (St.
Bonaventure, 1955), p. 8: “quod terminus non supponit pro eo quod significat
quando supponit personaliter, probo.” Cf. Spade, “Walter Burley on the Simple
Supposition of Singular Terms,” Topoi 16 (1997): 7–13.
8. Burleigh, De Puritate, p. 3. On p. 2 he writes: “vox quandocumque supponit
pro aliquo suo inferiori, tunc supponit personaliter.”
9. See, e.g., W. Burley, “From the Beginning of his Treatise on the Kinds of Signs,”
trans. P. V. Spade, Topoi 16 (1997): 95–102, n.9, p. 100.
10. E. A. Synan, “The Universal and Supposition in a Logica attributed to
Richard of Campsall,” in J. R. O’Donnell, ed., Nine Mediaeval Thinkers (Toronto,
1955), pp. 183–232, 198: “contingit . . . aliquando terminum supponere pro illo
quod nullo modo significat, sicut patet in ista propositione: homo est vox, homo
enim supponit ibi pro quadam voce quam tamen non significat.”
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such as ‘ly’.11 John Dorp, in his commentary (ostensibly on Buridan, but
actually  on Marsilius  of Inghen) describes material supposition  not as
Buridan had, but as had Marsilius, as that of a term for its non-ultimate
significates, that is, for itself or its like.12 Thus, all three reject any idea of
material supposition’s being non-significative, instead distinguishing those
cases where a term has its ordinary signification from those where it sig-
nifies itself or signs similar to it.
I intend to demonstrate that the rejection of non-significative supposi-
tion was essential to the coherence of the medieval doctrine of signification.
Karger described  the change as the rejection of Ockhamist semantics,
identifying the significata with the denotata.13 But this suggests that the
revised doctrine is somehow incompatible with Ockham’s theory of signifi-
cation. It certainly rejects his account of (material) supposition. But in fact
it makes coherent what was incoherent in the role of concepts in Ockham’s
doctrine.
In fact, the realization that a term cannot supposit for what it does not
signify occurred much earlier than the end of the fourteenth century. It
came around the middle of the century, contemporaneously with Buridan,
and  was,  I argue,  the result of novelties due to Thomas Maulfelt and
Marsilius of Inghen. To understand their insight, we need first to review the
medieval theory of signification, and the pivotal role of concepts in it.
II. SIGNIFICATION AND CONCEPTS
The medieval theory of supposition depended on a theory of signification.
The two came together to provide a theory of truth, which in turn fed
into a theory of inference. The theory of signification describes generally
11. Paul of Pergula, Logica, ed. M. A. Brown (St. Bonaventure, 1961), p. 24:
“Suppositionum . . . materialis est acceptio termini in propositione pro suo materi-
ali significato . . . Significatum materiale est quod aliquis terminus significat pro
quo vel de pronomine demonstrante illud non potest affirmative verificari sine
signo materiali.”
12. Perutile compendium totius logice Johannis Buridani cum preclarissima Solertissimi
Viri Joannis dorp expositione (Venice, 1499; Frankfurt, 1965), sign. h4vb: “vel terminus
supponit pro suo significato non ultimato in ordine ad illum conceptum secundum
quem dicitur suum significatum non ultimatum: et sic est suppositio materialis.”
13. Karger, “La Supposition Materielle,” p. 337: “Mais c’est une autre option
que nous allons examiner, celle qui consiste à récuser la sémantique ockhamiste
elle-même, en particulier le sens donné par Ockham à «significatio». On éviterait en
effet que «l’implication de non-grammaticalité» ne s’impose, en redéfinissant la
significatio de telle sorte que toute entité à laquelle un terme peut renvoyer (c’est-à-
dire qu’il «dénote») soit un signifié de ce terme. Autrement dit, ces deux relations
sémantiques que la théorie  d’Ockham comporte  [dénotation et signification]
devraient être identifiées l’une à l’autre.”
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how words relate to things, and how propositions come to mean what
they do. But this general description needs a further account of how a
particular occurrence of a word in a particular proposition is related to
which things in what way. Only then can one say what has to be the case
for the proposition to be true, and so determine how truth is preserved
in an inference.
For the medievals in whom I am interested, the signification of words
and propositions was made possible by their link to concepts. Vocal signs
are seen as imposed by custom as marks or signs for concepts, and written
signs are in turn  marks  or  signs for  vocal signs, and  so  indirectly for
concepts. Concepts, however, signify or conceive a range of objects natu-
rally, not by any conventional imposition. Concepts are formed by abstrac-
tion from sensory cognition. These medieval thinkers inherited from
Aristotle, and took further, an elaborate, rich theory of cognitive powers
which drew from sensation the whole panoply of cognitive awareness. The
common sense discovers shape, motion and other aspects of cognition not
present in each particular sense—separate experiences are needed to dis-
cern motion, and both sight and touch are needed to learn about shape or
figure. An estimative or cogitative sense is needed to recognize the hostility
of the wolf or the friendliness of the dog, qualities not immediately evident
in sensation. Further composition and division is needed to create further
concepts, and abstraction to understand generality. But they were empiri-
cists, following Aristotle in believing that all knowledge is derived from the
senses. “The mind is a tabula rasa on which nothing is at first written, but
can be written” (De Anima 430a1). The innate powers of cognition were
manifold and considerable, but no more than is necessary to the empiricist
project of obtaining all real knowledge through the senses.
Concepts, therefore, have a natural epistemological relation to the
class of things which they signify. To call it “natural” means that the concept
is linked by a law-like causal connection to that of which it is a concept, that
causal link being explained by the mind’s cognitive abilities. Conventional
signs, the signs of spoken and written language, in contrast, gain their
signification only by being linked by custom and practice to those natural
signs. They obtain their signification indirectly, in what has been called a
“dog-legged” manner.14 Their immediate signification, or what they are
primarily attached or subordinate to, is the concept; thereby, their ultimate
signification is the range of things to which the concept applies.15
14. S. Blackburn, Spreading the Word (Oxford, 1984), p. 40.
15. See, Buridan, “Tractatus de Suppositionibus,” p. 202 (corrected by H.
Hubien): “dictiones categorematicae innatae supponere significant res aliquas
mediantibus conceptibus earum, secundum quos conceptus, vel similes, imposi-
tae fuerunt ad significandum. Sic ergo illas res illis conceptibus conceptas voca-
mus ‘significata ultimata’ in proposito, illos autem conceptus vocamus ‘significata
immediata’.”
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Take the noun ‘asina’, for example: whereas ‘asina’ signifies all she-
asses—whatever shares the natural likeness of she-ass—the term will suppo-
sit differently for different classes of she-ass in different propositions.16
Those propositions can occur in writing, in speech, or in the mind, com-
posed, respectively, of written, spoken, or mental terms. Nonetheless, those
terms will relate differently to their significates in different linguistic con-
texts. So, for example, in ‘Asina hominis est in prato meo’, ‘asina’ supposits only
for she-asses presently existing, whereas in ‘Adduxerunt asinam’, ‘asinam’
supposits for  she-asses  existing in the  past as  well.17 Even when  terms
supposit for the same (class of) objects, they may supposit for them differ-
ently. In ‘Omnis asina est alicuius asina’, the first occurrence of ‘asina’ will
supposit for (the same) she-asses differently from the second occurrence.
The modes of supposition provided a theoretical context in which to de-
scribe these differences.
In all these cases, however, ‘asina’ or ‘asinam’ supposits for she-asses.
But not all occurrences of ‘asina’ behave in this way. A typical exception is
‘Asina est vox’. ‘Asina’ here does not supposit for any (class of) asses at all—or
if it does, the proposition is false, for no ass is a sound. If we are to explain
our intuition that the proposition can be uttered and be true, we need to
explain how ‘asina’ functions there, and the natural thought is that it
supposits for the word ‘asina’ itself. It is the spoken word ‘asina’ which is a
sound. ‘Asina est vox’ is at best ambiguous, false when taken to describe asses
as sounds, true when taken to describe the word ‘asina’ as one.
But we have noted that supposition relates to, and varies between,
different occurrences of a term in different propositions. So it is the par-
ticular occurrence of ‘asina’ in the proposition ‘Asina est vox’ which has this
different kind of supposition, one ‘asinam’ does not have in ‘Adduxerunt
asinam’. Yet it does not supposit, therefore, only for itself, namely, that
particular occurrence of ‘asina’ in that proposition. For example, when
Plato says, ‘Homo  est vox prolata a  me’, ‘homo’ supposits  for  itself; when
Socrates says, ‘Homo profertur a Platone’, ‘homo’ supposits not for itself but for
the occurrence of ‘homo’ spoken by Plato. Indeed, since ‘Asina est vox’ above
16. Note that this should not be read as saying that the term supposits for a
class. I am using ‘class’ as a collective noun. Just as if I buy a flock of sheep or a brace
of pheasants, what I buy are sheep and pheasants, so if a term supposits for a class
of she-asses, it supposits for the she-asses.
17. Ockham in fact disagrees with many of his contemporaries in the analysis
of such a proposition as ‘Adduxerunt asinam’, or for a clearer example of this point,
‘Homo erat albus’. The orthodox view in the theory of ampliation was that ‘homo’
supposits there for both present and past men. Ockham argued that this gave the
wrong truth-condition. Rather,  the  proposition  is ambiguous,  on  one reading
meaning that there was a man (perhaps now dead, or changed into a woman)
who was white, on the other, that there is a man (possibly now black) who was
white. See G. Priest and S. Read, “Ockham’s Rejection of Ampliation,” Mind 90
(1981): 274–79.
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was a written proposition, ‘asina’ does not there supposit for itself at all, for
written (and mental) terms cannot be heard. Rather, ‘asina’ in ‘Asina est vox’
supposits for all vocal occurrences of the term ‘asina’—that is, for the vocal
term ‘asina’.18 At least, that is what the theory must show, if it is to explain
the apparent truth of the proposition.
Accordingly, material supposition is contrasted with personal supposi-
tion, the latter being that mode of supposition in which a term supposits
for that of which it can be truly predicated, the former that where it
supposits for a vocal or written term. The distinction seems clear, and
several modern commentators leave the matter at this point.19 There are,
however, a number of complications that need to be dealt with.
The definition of material supposition says that a term has this mode
of supposition when it supposits for itself or for something similar. But
‘vox’ can have personal supposition even when it supposits for itself, for
it belongs to the range of its own significates. For example, in the spoken
proposition, ‘Omnis vox est sonus’, ‘vox’ supposits personally for itself, saying
that it itself, among other things, is a sound.20 To clarify the account of
material supposition, our authors realized, a further exclusion clause was
needed. We thus find the description of material supposition as non-
significative. Ockham adds the phrase, ‘when a term does not supposit
significatively’.21 The need is to distinguish those cases where a word has
personal supposition for itself (e.g., ‘Omnis vox profertur’) from those where
it has material supposition for itself (e.g., ‘Vox est sonus’ or ‘Vox est nomen’).
Secondly, more needs to be said about the phrase ‘or for something
similar’. For we find what seems to be material supposition even when the
expression referred to is not (exactly) similar. Ockham’s examples are ‘Ani-
mal predicatur de homine’, in which ‘homine’ supposits for ‘homo’, and ‘Hominem
currere est verum’, in which ‘hominem currere’ supposits for ‘Homo currit’.22 Some
18. The proof that it supposits for all vocal occurrences of the term is (1) that
in ‘Omnis homo est dissyllaba’, ‘homo’ must supposit for all occurrences of ‘homo’—see
e.g., Marsilius of Inghen, Suppositiones, in Treatises on the Properties of Terms, ed. and
trans. E. Bos (Reidel, 1983), pp. 58–60; and (2) that ‘Omnis asina est vox’ and ‘Asina
est vox’ differ only in mode of supposition, not in what they supposit for.
19. For example, P. Boehner, Medieval Logic (Manchester, 1952), pp 46–47; A.
Broadie, Introduction to Medieval Logic, 2d. ed. (Oxford, 1993), p. 31. Calvin Nor-
more gets close to the question when he asks (“Material supposition and the mental
language of Ockham’s Summa Logicae,” Topoi 16 [1997]: 27–33, 29): “what deter-
mines exactly which are the terms for which it can materially supposit?” But he
never answers the question, what determines it, concentrating instead on the more
common issue of the exact range of material supposition.
20. Buridan, “Tractatus de Suppositionibus” p. 204 (corrected by H. Hubien):
“in hac propositione vocali ‘omnis vox est sonus’ termini supponunt personaliter, li-
cet supponant pro se ipsis, quia non supponunt pro se ipsis nisi ea ratione qua sunt
cum aliis vocibus et sonis significata ultimata harum vocum ‘vox’ et ‘sonus’.”
21. Ockham, Summa Logicae, Part I, chap. 64.
22. Ockham, Summa Logicae, Part I, chap. 67.
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authors accordingly expanded the definition to read ‘or for something simi-
lar or dissimilar to itself’.23
At this point, a question should arise: What unites these cases? Material
supposition covers terms suppositing for themselves, for things similar to
themselves, and for things in various ways dissimilar to themselves. What is
included here, and what is excluded?
In fact, the question has more bite: How is material supposition even
possible? For the theory of signification was developed in order to explain
how a term or expression was related to a range of objects. Signification
depends on the existence of concepts—or cognitions—uniting a range of
things sharing a natural likeness. Supposition relies on signification to
determine the class of things related to an expression in a proposition in
order to determine, in turn, the truth-condition of propositions containing
that term.
We are now presented with an arbitrary exception to the theory. In the
standard case, a term supposits personally, that is, when it supposits for what
it signifies. However, in some cases it does not supposit for what it signi-
fies—only in this way can we explain how a proposition like ‘Asina est vox’ is
true—and so it is said to have material supposition. In such a case, the term
has a different class of supposita. But what class, and how is it possible? If
signification was really needed to explain personal supposition, then how
can material supposition work without it? Conversely, if material supposi-
tion is possible—to cite some entirely new class of supposita—then it would
seem that the theory of signification is really irrelevant to the description
of personal supposition and the theory of truth.
The problem is not unique to medieval supposition theory. In Frege’s
semantic theory, sense is a “route to” reference, that is, the reference of an
expression in a proposition is determined by its sense, possibly in conjunc-
tion with other determinants—its context, both linguistic and non-linguis-
tic.24 For example, the term ‘the ass’ in ‘The ass is eating my grass’ refers to
a particular donkey as a result of the sense of ‘ass’, the use of the definite
article (in virtue of which it refers to an object, not a concept) and the
non-linguistic context, namely, which donkey is the focus of attention on
that occasion of utterance.
However, Frege famously has a doctrine of indirect reference, whereby
certain occurrences of terms refer to their customary senses rather than
their customary references. For example, in ‘I believe the ass is eating my
grass’, the phrase ‘the ass’ refers not to a donkey, but to the customary sense
23. See, e.g., Buridan, “Tractatus de Suppositionibus,” p. 202: “non oportet
tamen quod supponat pro se ipsa, sed supponit saepe pro alio vel proportionali”;
Albert, Perutilis Logicae (Venice, 1522), tract 2, ch.3, C. Kann, ed., Die Eigenschaf-
ten der Termini (Leiden, 1994), p. 173: “pro se vel pro aliquo sibi simili vel dis-
simili.”
24. See M. Dummett, The Interpretation of Frege’s Philosophy (London, 1981),
p. 45.
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of the expression ‘the ass’. Thereby, Frege is able to explain the apparent
failure of substitution in such contexts. Substitution under coreference is a
universally valid procedure, he believed. Exceptions are explained by denial
of the minor premise, or at least, its relevance—the terms substituted are
not really coreferents, for the terms, when so placed, refer to their custom-
ary senses, and those are different. In his famous example, ‘Hesperus’ and
‘Phosphorus’ differ in sense (they are different ways of referring to Venus)
and so the latter cannot replace the former in, for example, ‘I believe
Hesperus is the second planet from the Sun’ with any logical guarantee that
truth will be preserved.
Once again, however, an exception to the theory must either be em-
braced by the theory, or threaten to destroy its whole basis. The basis of
Frege’s theory is that sense determines reference. Reference is not capri-
cious, but is mediated by sense. Hence one cannot simply say that, in some
contexts, the reference is different, and not that determined by sense. If
sense determines reference, as the theory says, it must always do so, and may
not be set aside when circumstances demand a variation. Simply to say that in
‘I believe Hesperus is the second planet from the Sun’, ‘Hesperus’ has a ref-
erence different from its customary one would be not merely ad hoc, blocking
an apparent counterexample to the principle of substitution; it would be
contrary to the theory. Sense does not determine reference only when it is
convenient for us that it do so. Sense determines reference tout court.
Frege’s solution to this problem in his theory, taken up by Church, was
a doctrine of indirect sense.25 Expressions in these contexts have a sense
different from their customary sense. It is this indirect sense which deter-
mines their reference and ensures that they refer to their customary senses
in these contexts. So far, so good: we are now back within the theory, rather
than providing exceptions to it. But a question remains: What is this indirect
sense? Frege and Church claim that to each expression there corresponds
an indefinite infinity of senses, one for each possible level of embedding in
an indirect context. Each is different, they claimed, for at each level a
different criterion of what substitutions are possible operates.
There are problems here for Frege’s theory, and it is not clear that
Frege foresaw them. Many commentators do not.26 But the focus of
25. See Frege, ‘On Sense and Reference’, trans. in P. Geach and M. Black, ed.,
Philosophical Writings (Oxford, 1966), pp. 56–78, 59; A. Church, “A Formulation of
the Logic of Sense and Denotation,” in P. Henle et al., ed., Structure, Method and
Meaning (New York, 1951), pp. 3–24, 12 n.13. See also L. Linsky, Referring (London,
1967), p. 31.
26. For example, A. Kenny, Frege (London, 1995), pp. 137–38. F. von Kut-
schera, Gottlob Frege (Berlin, 1989), p. 87, denies such a hierarchy is necessary. The
argument is this: Church and Frege concede that the linguistic context plays a role
in determining that the expression has a different sense in this context, the indirect
sense then pointing to the indirect referent. An alternative, and simpler, explana-
tion is that the linguistic context feeds directly into the customary sense to yield the
indirect referent. The indirect sense is unnecessary.
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the present paper is  the problem as it  affects the medieval theory of
supposition.
Truth is not arbitrary; it is a matter of convention. Words, written and
spoken, are conventionally imposed to signify, via a concept (on the medie-
val account), a range of significates; and particular utterances are true or
false depending on how exactly their constituent terms relate to what class
of their significates. The doctrine of material supposition hangs free of that
theoretical framework, suggesting that words can also be used capriciously.
But there is nothing capricious about material supposition. What is lacking
is the further theory needed to bring it within the framework. What is
needed is a theory of the signification of terms in their different function
when  suppositing materially. What unites the  range of things (in fact,
expressions) for which terms supposit when suppositing materially?
III. NATURAL SIGNIFICATION: PROPER AND BROAD
The central doctrine of the medieval theory is that signification is mediated
by concepts, mental signs whose natural and intrinsic signification for a
class of objects is established by certain epistemic powers of the mind, and
which passes to spoken and written signs as a result of their conventional
attachment to these mental signs. The general idea is that, for a term to
supposit for a range of objects, the term should either itself be a concept,
or be conventionally imposed on a concept, so that, depending on the
particular linguistic and non-linguistic context of its occurrence in a propo-
sition, it will supposit in some way for some class of the natural significates
of that concept. What we presently require is an account of what concept
unites the supposita of a term with material supposition.
What is needed is a concept which unites the spoken or written expres-
sions by their natural likeness. Thus we have, for example, the concept of
the spoken term ‘asina’, the concept of the written term ‘vox’, and the
concept of the (written or spoken) proposition ‘Homo currit’. The spoken
word ‘asina’ is conventionally imposed on the concept of she-ass, and so
comes conventionally to signify she-asses. But there is a natural likeness
among the spoken word ‘asina’, and so ‘asina’ comes to signify naturally the
concept of the spoken word ‘asina’ itself. This is not a conventional imposi-
tion on and signification of a concept, for no convention is needed, as it
would be to make ‘asina’ signify the concept of the word ‘man’, for exam-
ple. It is the same operation of the mind which forms the concept of the
word ‘asina’ signifying occurrences of the word ‘asina’ as forms, for exam-
ple, the concept of the animal she-ass which naturally signifies she-asses.
The result was the doctrine of ultimate and non-ultimate signification.
But first, we should trace a different story, the distinction between proper
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and broad, or improper, natural signification. We find it in the writings of
a group of logicians from the middle of the fourteenth century, namely,
Thomas Maulfelt, Albert of Saxony, and John of Holland, whose doctrines
of supposition are remarkably similar. John of Holland taught at Prague in
the late 1360s and early 1370s.27 Albert of Saxony was master at Paris from
1351 to 1362.28 What, however, of Thomas Maulfelt?
Maulfelt was the author of a full range of treatises on the properties of
terms (suppositions, confusions, consequences, and the like) which survive
in numerous manuscripts. However, there is no firm evidence as to his
identity, his origins, or even his date. He is often described as “Thomas
anglicus,” but this would in fact suggest that he did not work and study in
England. Sönke Lorenz, in his extensive study of the school of Erfurt and
the work of John Aurifaber, argues that Maulfelt influenced Aurifaber when
the latter was at Paris in the 1330s.29 He therefore concludes that Maulfelt
should be identified with a master Thomas anglicus mentioned as a Paris
master in 1331.
The definitions of material supposition given by Maulfelt, Albert, and
John of Holland exhibit a remarkable verbal similarity, distinguishing them
from the definitions adopted by, on the one hand, Ockham and Buridan,
and on the other, by Marsilius and Dorp. The definitions offered by the
three authors are shown in parallel, to highlight their similarity:
Bos has already noted the influence of Thomas Maulfelt on John of Hol-
land.33 Thomas proceeds to elaborate: what is essential to material supposi-
Suppositio materialis
est terminus stans pro
se vel pro alio sibi simili
in voce vel in scripto




mate. vel pro  aliqua
alia voce que non est





qui accipitur pro se vel
pro aliquo sibi simili
vel dissimili eodem
modo vel aliter suppo-
nente cui non imponi-
tur ad significandum,





nens pro se vel pro
aliquo sibi simili in
voce vel in scripto
eodem modo vel aliter
supponente cui non
imponitur ad signifi-
candum nec istud pro
quo supponit natur-
aliter   proprie signifi-
cat.32
27. John of Holland, Four Tracts on Logic, ed. E. P. Bos (Nijmegen, 1985),
Suppositiones, pp. 13*–14*.
28. See C. Kann, Die Eigenschaften der Termini, p. 9.
29. S. Lorenz, Studium Generale Erfordense (Stuttgart, 1989), pp. 234 ff.
30. Thomas Maulfelt, De Suppositionibus, ms. Edinburgh 138, f. 62r.
31. Albert of Saxony, Perutilis Logicae, ed. Kann, p. 173.
32. John of Holland, Suppositiones, p. 11.
33. John of Holland, Supp., pp. 21*–24*.
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tion is not that the term does not signify what it supposits for, but that it
should not have been imposed to signify it, for in that case it would have
personal supposition. Proper natural signification contrasts with natural
signification in the broad sense, and it is the latter which provides material
supposition:
Additur etiam ista particula nec ipsum proprie naturaliter significat, quia
quidam conceptus significat se communiter naturaliter vel etiam suum
simile ut iste conceptus homo vel consimilis. Quidam conceptus signi-
ficat se naturaliter proprie ut isti conceptus qualitas, ens et huiusmodi.
Dicitur significare se naturaliter proprie quia importat se naturaliter et
suum simile in voce vel in scripto quod tamen eundem conceptum ex
impositione voluntaria representat. Omnis igitur conceptus stans in
propositione mentali pro isto quod significat naturaliter communiter
supponit materialiter. Exemplum ut homo est conceptus anime mee posito
quod sic intelligam. Sed si conceptus propositionis supponit pro isto
quod naturaliter proprie representat dicitur supponere personaliter, ut
in exemplo Qualitas conciptur a me.34
Note, however, that broad natural signification is defined here only for
concepts, that is, mental terms. As Albert (and John, following him) writes:
et dicebatur ultimo: nec illud pro quo supponit naturaliter proprie significat
quoad terminos mentales qui non significant aliquid ex impositione
sed naturaliter. Et significant aliqua naturaliter proprie, aliqua autem
naturaliter communiter.35
What is left unclear is whether written and spoken terms have such a broad
natural signification. But we can find an earlier conception of a term
naturally signifying itself which does extend to vocal terms. In an anony-
mous text on equivocation of the end of the thirteenth century, we read:36
Verbi gratia, ‘homo’ significat se cum dicimus ‘homo est disillabum’,
sed significat suum significatum cum dicimus ‘homo est substantia’. Et
arguitur quod vox significans se et suum significatum sit equivoca . . .
quia vox inportat se vel significat naturaliter, sed significatum suum
significat ad voluntatem inponentis . . . Oppositum arguitur . . . Pro-
batio minoris, scilicet quod vox significans se etc. non significat ad
placitum, quia tantum ad placitum significat unum, scilicet suum signi-
ficatum, sed se significat naturaliter.
Maulfelt and Albert’s conception of material supposition does raise one
problem, however. Recall that in §II we observed one requirement on the
34. Maulfelt, De Supp., f. 63r.
35. Albert of Saxony, Per. Log., p. 174. Cf. John of Holland, Supp., p. 12.
36. “Anonymus Pragensis on Equivocation,” ed. Dafne Muré, Cahiers de l’Insti-
tut du Moyen-Âge Grec et Latin 68 (1998): 63–97, 68–69.
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theory be that it show how ‘vox’ in ‘Vox est nomen’ can have material supposi-
tion, despite the fact that it does signify itself (conventionally). But Maulfelt’s
phrase, ‘cui non imponitur ad significandum’, will exclude this possibility. Albert
of Saxony writes: “quia hic terminus vox est impositus ad significandum se, supponit
pro se non materialiter sed personaliter” (Per. Log., p. 194). Thomas, too, said that
‘qualitas’ supposits naturally. They grasp the nettle; but the result is counter-
intuitive. There is a difference between saying that some spoken sound is a
noun or that I conceive some quality and saying of this particular sound,
namely, ‘vox’, that it is a noun, or that I conceive of ‘quality’ itself.
A further step was needed, and one of the first authors, perhaps the
first, to take it appears to have been Marsilius of Inghen, writing in Paris
in the 1360s.37 It is the distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate
signification.
IV. ULTIMATE AND NON-ULTIMATE SIGNIFICATION
Marsilius defines material supposition in a manner reminiscent of Maulfelt
and the others. However, he introduces his own distinctive features. One is
that he does not restrict the modes of discrete and common supposition
(determinate, confused, and so on) to personal supposition, but extends
them to material supposition. Thus his definition of discrete material sup-
position reads:
Suppositio discreta materialis est acceptio termini discreti stantis pro
uno solo significato non-ultimato de quo terminus talis verificatur
mediante copula talis propositionis.
This being the first of the modes of material supposition he defines, and so
the first introduction of non-ultimate signification, he proceeds to explain
this term. He writes:
Notandum quod significatum termini non ultimatum vocatur ipse ter-
minusmet aut sibi similis aut equivalens, cum primo semper terminus
se ipsum et sibi similem intellectui representet, deinde significatum
intellectui ostendit suum ultimatum, scilicet rem extra pro qua talis
terminus dicitur stare significative. Exempli gratia: significatum non
ultimatum istius termini homo est ipsemet aut sibi similis aut equiva-
lens. Sed significatum ultimatum est ipsa res extra, sicut animal ration-
ale mortale, quia ultimate rem extra significat. Et ideo breviter:
significatum ultimatum termini est res extra quam talis terminus ex
impositione significat si sit vocalis vel scriptus, et est eius naturalis
37. Marsilius of Inghen, Suppositiones (see n.18), pp. 6–9.
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similitudo si sit terminus mentalis. Significatum non ultimatum dicitur
ipsemet terminus vel sibi equivalens.38
Two things should be noted: first, not only mental terms but also spoken
and written terms have non-ultimate signification. Secondly, it follows that
all material supposition (since the same basic formula is repeated for each
type of material supposition), whether of mental, spoken, or written terms,
will be a kind of significative supposition. Though Marsilius does not state
it generally, a term has material supposition when it supposits for its non-
ultimate significates, in some way or other.
Recall the scribal addition of ‘ultimate’ in the Edinburgh ms. of the text
of Maulfelt’s cited earlier. The term must not have been imposed to signify
itself or its like ultimately. It does, however, in the new account signify it
non-ultimately.39
The notion of broad natural signification is, however, not found in
Marsilius. The two notions are brought together, perhaps for the first time,
in Peter of Ailly’s treatise on Concepts, written only a few years later, in Paris
in the early 1370s.40 But Peter makes an important new observation. “To
signify naturally,” he observes, “may be taken in two senses: in a proper
sense and in a general sense,” (§32) as Spade renders ‘significat naturaliter
communiter’, which I rendered above as “broad” natural signification. To
signify naturally in this broad or general sense is
to represent not by itself, but by means of something else, something to
a cognitive power by vitally changing [that power]. And this pertains to
any thing whatever. For any thing is by its nature apt to cause a concept
of itself in an intellective power . . . From this it follows that every thing
signifies or is apt to signify itself naturally in a general sense. (§33)
That everything signifies itself naturally in the broad sense is a crucial
observation.
Consequently, corresponding to a spoken sign, like ‘homo’, there are
two concepts. (§63) There is the concept of man that it signifies by conven-
tion non-ultimately, which properly and naturally signifies men, who are the
ultimate significates of the spoken sign. In addition, there is the concept of
the sound ‘homo’, which naturally and properly signifies the sound ‘homo’,
and by means of which the sound ‘man’ broadly and naturally signifies
itself, and by which it is its own non-ultimate significate. Ailly notes that in
the latter case, “some people say it has material supposition.” Thus he is
38. Marsilius of Inghen, Suppositiones, p. 54.
39. Cf. Peter of Ailly, Concepts and Insolubles, ed. P. V. Spade (Dordrecht, 1980),
§65 and Spade’s n.210.
40. Trans. P. V. Spade, Concepts and Insolubles. The two distinctions also appear
in a treatise on Concepts by Thomas of Cleves, also composed in Paris in the early
1370s. See n.42 below.
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aware of Marsilius’s view: “when a spoken term . . . supposits or is taken for
itself, it is taken for a non-ultimate significate.” (§67)
The ultimate significates of ‘asina’ are she-asses, the animals; the non-
ultimate significates of the term are itself and other similar terms. But we
have to be careful here in capturing the medievals’ manifold use of the term
‘ultimate’. The vocal term ‘asina’ signifies non-ultimately (and convention-
ally) the ultimate concept of she-ass. It signifies ultimately (and conven-
tionally) she-asses. And it signifies itself naturally in the broad sense
(naturaliter communiter) and is its non-ultimate significate. Indeed, anything
whatever signifies itself naturally in the broad sense. Moreover, ‘asina’ also
signifies terms similar to it in this way. Writing towards the end of the
fourteenth century, John Dorp put it thus:
Est ergo notandum quod terminus dicitur dupliciter significare. Uno
modo ad placitum. Alio modo naturaliter: et utroque istorum modorum
adhuc terminus dicitur dupliciter significare. Nam uno modo terminus
dicitur significare ad placitum non ultimate. Alio modo terminus dicitur
significare ad placitum ultimate. Unde terminus vocalis vel scriptus dici-
tur significare ad placitum non ultimate conceptum ultimatum quo
mediante terminus vocalis vel scriptus significat res ad extra . . . Sed
vocalis vel scriptus dicitur significare ad placitum ultimate rem ad extra
ad quam talis terminus imponitur ad significandum. Similiter terminus
dicitur dupliciter significare naturaliter scilicet naturaliter communiter
et naturaliter proprie. Unde quilibet terminus: similiter quelibet res
mundi significat se naturaliter communiter. Sed terminus dicitur signifi-
care naturaliter proprie illud quod representat formaliter seipso et non
mediante alio: et sic significare naturaliter proprie precise convenit
noticiis ipsius anime: quia nihil aliud representat suum significatum non
mediante seipso. Ex istis patet quod duplex est significatum. Nam quod-
dam est significatum ultimatum: aliud est significatum non ultimatum.
Unde significatum ultimatum est illud significatum termini quod termi-
nus significat ad placitum ultimate vel naturaliter proprie. Et significa-
tum non ultimatum termini est ipsemet terminus vel alius sibi similis in
voce vel in scripto vel equivalens in mente.
‘Asina’, for example, ultimately signifies she-asses by virtue of its relation to
the concept of she-ass, which signifies she-asses naturally and properly. But in
virtue of what does ‘asina’ signify itself and its similars? In virtue of a further
concept, the concept of ‘asina’. Dorp does not describe it explicitly, but he re-
fers to it repeatedly in what follows. He first observes an immediate corollary:
Correlarie sequitur quod ly ens significat se conceptu ultimato et con-
ceptu non ultimato: patet correlarium: nam ille terminus ens conceptu
generalissimo omnes existens significat ad placitum ultimate: et tamen
ille terminus ens est met quoddam existens: ergo seipsum significat ad
placitum ultimate.41
41. Dorp, Per. comp., sign. h4vb.
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And again, in his description of material supposition:
Suppositio materialis est acceptio termini in propositione pro suo sig-
nificato non ultimato vel suis significatis non ultimatis: et hoc in ordine
ad illum conceptum secundum quem est suum significatum non ulti-
matum. (op.cit., sign. h5ra)
In other words, there are two concepts corresponding to the vocal and
written terms ‘asina’, and indeed to every term. Thus, to every convention-
ally signifying term there are four things signified: the two concepts, and
the two classes of things conceived by those concepts. We find this set out
explicitly by Paul of Gelria, in his treatise on concepts of around 1380:
Notandum quod omni signo ad placitum significanti correspondent ad
minus quattuor significata, scilicet duo conceptus et res illis concep-
tibus concepte. Exemplum: huic termino vocali ‘homo’ significanti ad
placitum correspondet primo conceptus qui est naturalis similitudo
huius vocis ‘homo’, et mediante isto significat se et quodlibet sibi simile
naturaliter, et ista sunt duo significata sua que naturaliter significat.
Deinde correspondet sibi conceptus qui est naturalis similitudo homi-
num quam significat ad placitum non ultimate, et mediante isto signi-
ficat ad placitum ultimate res ad extra, que sunt homines, ut Plato,
Sortes.42
Thus what provides the unity for material supposition is the non-ultimate
concept, the concept of the term itself. (See Figure 1.)
V. MATERIAL SUPPOSITION
My  question  was: How is material supposition possible? Right from its
earliest appearance, the concept of supposition was accompanied by that of
42. Paul of Gelria, De Conceptibus, ms. Giessen 86, f. 140va. Paul taught in Paris
from 1375 to 1382. An edition of Paul’s treatise will appear in E. Bos and S. Read,
Concepts: The Treatises of Thomas of Cleves and Paul of Gelria (Louvain, forthcoming).
Figure 1
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signification. A term signifies some class of things by means of its relation
to a concept which is a natural likeness of those things. Consequently, when
used in a proposition, a term can supposit for some or all members of this
class to which it is related by the relation of signification. But as described
by Ockham and his contemporaries, material supposition is an exception
to this picture. In material supposition, a term supposits for some other
thing or class of things—a linguistic or conceptual item—to which it is not
so related by signification. How can it do so; or turned on its head, the
question is, if it can do so, why invoke the relation of signification for the
other case, that of personal supposition?
What we find in a range of authors, all writing some years after Ock-
ham, is a more complex theory of signification. With each term there are
associated two concepts, two natural likenesses: one is its proper concept,
by which it signifies its proper ultimate significates; the other is a natural
likeness of itself, a concept which it signifies naturally in a broad sense, and
by which it signifies itself and its like as an expression. Material supposition
is then identified as the supposition of a term not for its proper signifi-
cates—thus revising and restricting the original exclusion of its significates
altogether—but for some or all of its non-ultimate significates via this other
concept which it naturally signifies in the broad sense.
There is a passage in Dorp, however (paralleled in Gelria), that seems
to run counter to this interpretation. It is crucial to the present interpreta-
tion that, for example, the vocal sign ‘homo’ should signify the written sign
‘homo’ naturally in the broad sense, and vice versa. Only then could the vocal
sign supposit materially for the written sign by virtue of its broad natural
signification for it, and the written for the vocal. But in his description of
the fourfold division of signification, Dorp writes:
Similiter terminus vocalis ad placitum non ultimate significat terminum
scriptum sibi synonimum: ut ista vox homo ad placitum non ultimate
significat hoc scriptum homo: et econtra hoc scriptum homo ad placi-
tum non ultimate significat illam vocem homo. (Per. comp., sig. h4vb)
Thus the written and spoken signs are said to signify each other convention-
ally. The conclusion seems to be that the written sign cannot be among the
“similars” which the vocal sign signifies broadly naturally, nor the vocal sign
be among the similars of the written sign.
However, it does not follow that, if a sign signifies something conven-
tionally, it cannot also signify it naturally. Dorp points out in the same
column  that  “isti termini ultimatum et non ultimatum . . . non opponuntur
contradictorie,” since the term ‘ens’ signifies itself conventionally and ulti-
mately, for it signifies everything, while at the same time it signifies itself
naturally in the broad sense (and so non-ultimately). That the written sign
signifies the vocal sign conventionally goes back to Aristotle’s De Interpreta-
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tione (16a26). That such signification gives rise to mutual signification, the
one for the other, is unsurprising, notes Gelria:
sic enim non est inconveniens quod signa sint sibi invicem signa, cum
signa et significatum sunt relativa que dicuntur ad convertentiam, ut
habetur in Predicamentis. (De conceptibus, f. 140vb)
What shows that the spoken and written signs must signify each other
broadly naturally is this: such signs have the power to cause a natural sign
and concept of themselves in the intellect which is a proper natural sign of
themselves and their similars (and dissimilars). By means of this concept,
the sign naturally signifies those similars in the broad sense. They become
its non-ultimate significates. Material supposition is supposition for the
non-ultimate  significates. A spoken  sign can supposit  materially  for  its
written equivalents and vice versa. Hence each must be among the non-
ultimate significates of each, by the same concept by which broad natural
signification is mediated. As Dorp explicitly says (as cited earlier): “et signi-
ficatum non ultimatum termini est ipsemet terminus vel alius sibi similis in voce vel
in scripto vel equivalens in mente.”
That ultimate and non-ultimate signification are not opposed also
resolves the outstanding problem of the putative material supposition of
‘vox’ in ‘vox est sonus’ and ‘vox est nomen’. Take the participle, ‘ens’. It signifies
everything. So how could it ever have material supposition, for it will always
signify itself ultimately? Spade accuses the late medieval logicians of care-
lessness in their definitions of supposition, so as to leave the question
open.43 But we have seen that it is not left open in Albert—with counterin-
tuitive results. It is not left open in Dorp, either, with a much more reason-
able answer. ‘Ens est participium’ is ambiguous, he says:
Correlarie sequitur quod ly ens significat se conceptu ultimato et con-
ceptu non ultimato . . . Dubitatur primo utrum subiectum huius propo-
sitionis ens est participium supponat materialiter aut personaliter . . . Pro
responsione dubii notandum est quod ille terminus ens in dicta proposi-
tione potest capi secundum alterum duorum conceptuum. Nam ly ens
potest capi secundum conceptum generalem mediante quo quodlibet
ens mundi significat. Vel ly ens in dicta propositione potest capi in
ordine ad conceptum specialem quo mediante ille terminus ens natu-
raliter significat se precise et alios terminos sibi similes. (Per. comp.,
h4vb–h5ra)
Thus, ‘ens’ supposits materially when it supposits for its non-ultimate signi-
ficate(s) by virtue of that concept according to which it is its non-ultimate
significate.
The significative conception of material supposition is repeated, var-
43. Peter of Ailly, Concepts, p. 112 n.216.
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ied, and emended as the century proceeds. It starts in Maulfelt and Albert
of Saxony. But the material supposition of spoken and written terms is still
non-significative in them. With Marsilius of Inghen all supposition becomes
significative. The two ideas are blended in Peter of Ailly, Paul of Gelria, John
Dorp, and others, and ultimately feed through into the description given by
the authors cited by Karger, Paul of Venice, and Paul of Pergula. It seems
clear that it  is  a Parisian invention. All  these authors,  except the last
two—running into the fifteenth century—were masters at Paris.
The germ of the doctrine—the notion of ultimate significate, con-
trasted with immediate significate, the concept, is found in Buridan. Buri-
dan himself, as we saw, belongs to the earlier tradition in sidelining material
supposition as non-significative. Nor can we find the inclusion of material
supposition as significative in earlier Parisian writers, e.g., Gerald Odo
(writing in Paris in the 1320s) or Walter Burley (who was at Paris from 1310
to 1323). But there is a further anticipation of the later doctrine in Buridan,
which emerges in his discussion of the sophism ‘Homo est species’ in his
treatise on fallacies. His analysis depends on distinguishing two concepts
corresponding to ‘homo’:
Unde ego dico quod propositio mentalis correspondens huic proposi-
tioni prout est vera ‘homo est species’ non est propositio in qua subici-
tur conceptus specificus hominum, sed est propositio in qua subicitur
conceptus quo concipitur conceptus specificus hominum, et ille iam
supponit non pro se, sed pro conceptu specifico hominum.44
If ‘homo’ corresponded to the concept of man (the specific concept, the
concept which naturally groups man as a species), ‘Homo est species’ would be
false (for it would say that a man was a species—that is the fallacy). Rather,
‘homo’ in that proposition corresponds to a concept by which that concept of
man is itself conceived, the concept of the concept, we might say. Buridan’s
position is not unlike that of Frege outlined in §II. Buridan realizes that an
explanation is needed why the term ‘homo’ in the spoken proposition, ‘Homo
est species’, supposits for the concept of man, not for men.
For all its neatness of solution, however, Buridan’s account, like
Frege’s, lacks an important feature. Are all spoken and written terms am-
biguous in this way, corresponding to two concepts? Not until Peter of Ailly
and his successors do we get a clear and systematic affirmative to that
question.
Terms in material supposition are not non-significative. Rather, they do
not have their proper signification, but a broad natural signification which
everything has, to encompass themselves and things like them. The con-
strual of material supposition as significative starts with Buridan, Maulfelt,
44. John Buridan, Summa Logica, tract 7 De Fallaciis, chap. 4, cited from S.
Ebbesen, “The Summulae, Tractatus VII De Fallaciis,” in The Logic of John Buridan, ed.
J. Pinborg (Copenhagen, 1976), pp. 139–60, 156.
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and Marsilius, slowly recognizing the need for a concept which unites the
term itself with its similars and thus provides a class of supposita for material
supposition. It reaches fruition in Ailly, Gelria, and Dorp, with the theory
of the non-ultimate concept.
It might seem that a final and definitive step is made by Paul of Pergula,
namely, the characterization of this new concept in positive terms. It is not
simply a further, non-ultimate concept; it is the concept of its “material
significates”, says Paul:45
Significatum materiale est quod aliquis terminus significat pro quo vel
de pronomine demonstrante illud non potest affirmative verificari sine
signo materiali ut: Iste terminus homo est ly homo.46
The material sign to which Paul refers is the adaptation of the French
article, ‘ly’. Whether Paul was the first to speak in this way of the material
significate, I do not know. But, in fact, it constitutes a retrograde step. For
Paul returns us to the unattractive position of Albert of Saxony, claiming
that for example, ‘ens’ can occur only in personal supposition. For a term
like ‘ens’, material and personal signification are the same. So too for
‘aliquid’, ‘qualitas’, ‘dictio’, ‘signum’, and so on, for terms of both first and
second intention. Paul gives priority to personal supposition: “omnis termi-
nus habens solum unum significatum est solum personaliter supponibilis ut: Ens est
ly ens. Utrumque ens supponit personaliter.”47 The reason is that signification
has become entirely extensional. There is no mention of the concept by
which the significates are mediated. Without this, he cannot distinguish the
personal from the material significate.
VI. CONCLUSION
I made two claims at the end of §I: (1) the recognition of material supposi-
tion as significative came long before the two Pauls—that is clear even from
Maulfelt’s  case and  entirely  so  from  Marsilius’s  and  (2) no significant
abandonment of Ockham’s theory of signification is involved. The notion
of broad natural signification adds to and extends the Ockhamist semantics,
but it does not overturn it. Indeed, it recognizes the incoherence of the
notion of non-significative supposition, and at last makes it coherent.
Karger denies this. Distinguishing between a term’s denotata and its
45. This is a very different notion of material significate from that found in John
Buridan (see L. M. De Rijk, “Buridan’s Doctrine of Connotation,” in J. Pinborg, ed.,
The Logic of John Buridan, p. 96) and Marsilius of Inghen (see his Appellationes, ed. Bos.
p. 130).
46. See n.11.
47. Paul of Pergula, Logica, p. 25.
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significata, she claims it central to Ockham’s theory that they differ: the
denotata are what a term can refer to (supposit for); its significata are those
things grouped together by the concept the term picks out. The autony-
mous use of terms (that is, roughly, their self-referential use) shows that a
term’s denotata are wider in extent than its significata.48
What was realized in Paris by Maulfelt and his successors was that the
role of concepts in the theory of signification was pointless if the autony-
mous use could circumvent it in this way. The Ockhamist position is simply
incoherent: if the significata of a term have any role to play, it is in providing
objects to be its supposita. If the supposita can be drawn from a wider
domain, the notion of signification breaks free entirely from semantics.
What defines the class of denotata of a term? Karger does not say: she
describes them as “toutes les entités aux-quelles ce terme peut—par les
conventions du langage—renvoyer (c’est-à-dire pour lesquelles il peut «sup-
poser»).”49 (p. 335). But how do the conventions of language demarcate
this class? By the mediation of concepts. Thus either one recognizes that
concepts need a role in the autonymous use—in material supposition—or
one’s theory is incoherent. Material supposition is possible, but only by
recognizing the presence of a second concept, the concept of a term and
its equiforms, naturally signified by the term not properly but in a broad
sense.
48. Karger, “La Supposition Materielle,” pp. 335–36.
49. She also admits that it is not found explicitly in Ockham himself (“La
Supposition Materielle,” pp. 335–36).
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